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Article
Peer-Review Record

A P2P Scheme for Debating and Voting with Unconditional Flexibility

Appl. Sci. 2024, 14(8), 3502; https://doi.org/10.3390/app14083502
by Diego Antonio López-García 1,*,†, Juan Pérez Torreglosa 2,†, David Vera 3,† and Manuel Sánchez-Raya 1,†
Reviewer 1: Anonymous
Reviewer 2: Anonymous
Reviewer 3: Anonymous
Appl. Sci. 2024, 14(8), 3502; https://doi.org/10.3390/app14083502
Submission received: 13 March 2024 / Revised: 14 April 2024 / Accepted: 16 April 2024 / Published: 21 April 2024
(This article belongs to the Special Issue Advanced Technologies in Data and Information Security III)

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The manuscript is well written, although it is not easy to read (perhaps some diagram could help). This work proposes a distributed e-voting scheme (boardroom), where the users act as the server in a centralized scheme. According to the results, the method proposed fulfill all the needed security requirements (privacy, eligibility, etc.), except for the scalability (group size), although this method improves a bit, as it is independent of the number of adversaries. Apart from this, existing boardrooms are not flexible, as they work with fixed and predefined kind of ballots, wheres the proposed one not (proposals, opinions, etc.). So, the contribution of this work is clear.

Some acronyms are not defined at their first usage.:
pg.1: P2P; pg.3: RSA, TOR, VPN, AP; pg.4: NAT, I2P; pg.5: TLS; pg.7: OS; pg.8: MITM.
Although some of them are very known, at least a list of acronyms at the end would be appreciated.

There are some minor typing mistakes or suggestions:
- pg.8: In Proof of Lemma 1, it is written "condition 4" and "condition 5", perhaps they are referred to the five assumptions defined above in section 4? This is not clear.
- pg.9,10,11,12,14: The abbreviations "his/er", "s/he" (instead of "his/her", "he/she") are unknown for me, as I'm not a native english speaker. Perhaps they are correct, but in some points, they can be replaced by "the user", specially on pg.14.
- pg.9: "{H1...H4}" -> "{H1,H2,H3,H4}" (in order to be written similarly to {U1,U2,U3,U4} just above).
- pg.9: the next statement seems to be incorrect: "lists is of Fig.3".
- pg.15: "internet" -> "Internet".

About Figures and Tables
------------------------
- Figures have quality and they do not look blurred. Only in Figure 2, the text "TLS protocolo initialization" overlaps with other text, perhaps the image needs to be wider, as in Figure 1.


About references/bibliography
-----------------------------
- The bibliography is updated and is enough.

Author Response

Please see attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The article "A P2P scheme for debating and voting with unconditional flexibility" by Diego Antonio López-García et al. presents a study in the field of electronic voting systems, particularly emphasizing the aspects of decentralization, privacy, and flexibility. The proposed P2P voting scheme addresses the critical vulnerabilities associated with centralized e-voting systems, notably the reliance on central servers which poses a risk of being a single point of failure and a target for malicious attacks. The novelty of this approach lies in its ability to overcome such limitations by employing a P2P model where the responsibilities traditionally held by central servers are distributed among the users themselves. This not only enhances the robustness of the voting system but also its transparency and security.

 

The authors have meticulously designed the scheme to ensure that it meets a comprehensive set of security requirements, such as privacy, eligibility, verifiability, and robustness, among others. The use of blind signatures and anonymous channels, for instance, provides a solid foundation for maintaining voter privacy and preventing traceability, which are paramount in any voting system. Additionally, the scheme's capability to accommodate debates and votes without imposing constraints on the ballots is particularly commendable.

Before recommendation for acceptance, some matters need to be addressed:

 

1.      Please review recent literature in encryption and strengthen your introduction to appeal for a broader audience such as:

i) Rozenman, Georgi Gary, et al. "The quantum internet: A synergy of quantum information technologies and 6G networks." IET Quantum Communication 4.4 (2023): 147-166.

ii) Perepechaenko, Maria, and Randy Kuang. "Quantum encryption of superposition states with quantum permutation pad in IBM quantum computers." EPJ Quantum Technology 10.1 (2023): 7.

2.      Given the detailed description of Phase 1: Obtaining an alias, a pertinent question arises concerning the scalability and efficiency of this phase, especially in larger networks:

How does the scheme ensure scalability and maintain efficiency in environments with a large number of users, considering that each user is required to establish n - 1 private TLS channels and manage multiple cryptographic operations with every other participant? Additionally, what measures are implemented to mitigate the potential computational and network overhead associated with these processes?

3.      Can you elaborate more on the scheme in the captions of figures 1-4?

4.      In line 558, to enhance the mobility and user accessibility of the scheme, it could be beneficial to integrate decentralized identity verification methods, such as blockchain-based digital identities. This approach would allow users to autonomously manage their digital certificates without relying on a centralized authority for signing. Can you compare it with one external reference?

5.      How were the error bars obtained in Figure 6(b)? In Figure 6, the caption should also be extended.

 

Comments on the Quality of English Language

The English level is fine.

Author Response

Please see attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Dear Authors,

please answer the following questions and revise the research paper according to them:

  1. What are the main vulnerabilities associated with traditional e-voting schemes that utilize central servers?
  2. How do boardroom e-voting schemes differ from traditional e-voting schemes in terms of server trust and user roles?
  3. What are the specific constraints that ballots in boardroom e-voting schemes must adhere to, and how do they conflict with the capabilities of recent debate tools?
  4. What are the key features provided by the new boardroom voting protocol mentioned in the text, and how do these features contribute to its flexibility and effectiveness?
  5. Can you summarize the experimental results mentioned in the text regarding the implementation of the boardroom voting protocol with two debate groups, and what insights or conclusions can be drawn from these results?

 

Author Response

Please see attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

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