Informed Ignorance as a Form of Epistemic Injustice

Round 1

Reviewer 1 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The author of the article explores an interesting phenomenon of informed ignorance. This position that evolves in an informational environment which involves voluntary avoidance of emotionally or cognitively challenging information. The author believes that one of the widely recognized culprits of the current information culture is the global adoption of social media. Other causes are deeply rooted in the modern practice of scientific research also they shaped by socioeconomic variables, which affect knowledge accessibility and literacy. The author notes that current manifestations of the relationship between information and knowledge in the digital sphere contribute to a degradation of epistemic virtues and the limitations of epistemic resources. Another source of this degradation is the loss of reverence towards knowledge, the recognition and theoretical implications of knowledge and the understanding of its practical significance. To correct the situation, the author suggests guided by the notions of epistemological ethics. These focus on promoting media literacy, scientific research standards, public engagement, and well-informed regulation. To improve the quality of the article, I would like to know the specific steps, advice or program of action that the author proposes to solve the identified problems, so that these are not just “good wishes”.

Author Response

Dear Reviewer,

Thank you for your time and the review provided. Regarding your request to provide a more elaborate program of action to face the challenges we have raised in the paper, we have edited and elaborated the section of the paper titled "fighting back" which details some courses of action we suggest to promote. Importantly, the paper endorses viewing the issue at hand within an epistemic framework as part of a counteracting strategy, for viewing the state of informed ignorance as an epistemic injustice provides more concrete material to support an appeal to epistemic authorities for providing appropriate tools for individuals to navigate the current information culture in a way that allows them to flourish and avoid harm.

Sincerely,

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The paper offers a well-informed overview of current problems relating to information in social media and media generally. It also suggests sensible responses to these problems. My concern with the paper is really that it does not seem original enough to be worth publishing except, perhaps, as an introduction to the topic. If it were the first essay in a collection that went on to explore related ideas in more depth and detail then it could serve a useful purpose. Otherwise it might seem a little too much like common sense, albeit knowledgeable and  thoughtful common sense. I'll comment on a few specific points in what follows.

In lines 48-49 the paper says that the problem of misinformation might seem benign and easy to overcome. This seems very unlikely to me. Surely everybody knows that fake news is a big problem?

The paper starts rather slowly, I thought, and the aims outlined in lines 77-78 don't sound like enough to make the paper really worthwhile. The topic is important, but what is offered does not sound very original.

What line 135 says seems true but well known.

Lines 141-142, on the other hand, promise something more interesting. If the paper could deliver more of this it would be significantly improved.

One problem that the paper faces is that it is very hard to identify concrete harms that have been done. Hence words like 'may' and 'can' crop up again and again (see, e.g., lines 211, 220, 227, 239 and 299). Yes, problems may occur, but (I found myself wanting to know) do they? How often? How seriously? It all sounds a little speculative. This is understandable, but the speculation needs to rise significantly above the level of common sense if it is to be worthwhile or interesting as an academic paper. Ideally the paper would provide more specific facts. Perhaps even ones that show commonsense speculation to be wrong on some points.

The suggested solutions of awareness and regulation in line 428 are a little underwhelming. Can the paper be more specific? Isn't there already a lot of awareness that misinformation is out there? The problem, it seems to me, is that people are bad at spotting it. Especially when it confirms their prejudices. To some extent people *want* misinformation. Raising awareness will not change that.

Lines 436-438 seem to imply that regulation could increase virtue. This is an interesting idea, but how would it work? Is there evidence that it could work?

Lines 454-455 mention creative ways to promote and reward evidence-based information. Some examples would be nice to see.

Lines 466-467 talk about holding people responsible. What would this mean? Imprisoning those who do wrong? Shaming them? Criticizing their behavior? 

Similarly, lines 475-476 talk about journalists' responsibility to present accurate information. I agree, but does mentioning this responsibility achieve anything? There are clearly plenty of people who are happy to engage in, and consume, propaganda. What can we do about this?

I hope I am not being unfair. I agree with almost everything the paper says. It just does not appear to suggest much of practical value that has not been said before.

Author Response

Please see the attachment

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

The article is wide-ranging. It argues that the current epistemic climate provides an abundance of easily accessible information but that far from this producing an abundance of knowledge it results in a situation that the authors characterise as ‘informed ignorance’. The argument depends, therefore, on there being a clear distinction between information and knowledge, where the former includes misinformation, false information, fake news, etc., and the latter implies epistemic standards that rule these out. Insufficiently regulated social media and technology are blamed for such phenomena as echo chambers, filter bubbles, algorithmic biases and influences, and data manipulation (line 90). The owners of new means of ‘knowledge production’ (but, surely, ‘information production’ would be a more appropriate term) are the new perpetrators of epistemic injustice and oppression. The authors argue that a climate of confusion and uncertainty has made people less confident or interested in the ‘validity of data’ or in claims to epistemic authority and expertise. In addition to the concept of informed ignorance, the concept of epistemic injustice is brought into play. The authors rightly ascribe this to Miranda Fricker. By bringing these two concepts together in the context of a degraded epistemic environment, the authors present a distinctive characterisation of the dangers and injustices in the current state of affairs and they then propose steps to address them, including regulatory and incentivising measures.

The article makes several familiar but important points. It is, perhaps, too wide-ranging, too ambitious: it skirts over complexities and difficulties that deserve a more through or critical analysis. The authors appear more comfortable with facts and ideas relating to information than to knowledge, than to the epistemological issues glanced at but not really discussed. Despite insisting, correctly, on the distinction between information and knowledge, they seem sometimes to confuse these themselves (e.g. line 58). Also, the term ‘knowledge’ is used by them sometimes to refer to true information in the public domain and sometimes to the epistemic achievement of knowing. These uses need to be distinguished, but their argument would seem to require a much greater emphasis than it has at the moment on the latter. They make rather superficial reference to virtue epistemology, to JTB (justified true belief), to fallibilism and reliabilism, to critical thinking, to integrity, but there is no systematic attempt to present a case concerning what distinguishes a believer (of either true or false beliefs) from a knower. The sort of conscientious epistemic evaluation of sources or testifiers, hinted at as being important, is not elaborated, and the concept of truth, though glanced at in the last paragraph, the term ‘post-truth’ and in the JTB reference, is not accorded the role the argument would lead one to expect,

The epistemological problems are present, also, in the references to epistemic injustice. Certainly, the authors do not use the term in the way that Fricker herself does. Her distinction between testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, and her emphasis on systematic identity prejudice, do not feature. Instead, a much wider and vaguer application of the term is deployed in a way that does not clearly add to the argument. The title ‘Beyond epistemic justice…’ is somewhat confusing, therefore.  Fricker’s point is that members of particular social groups or classes, as victims of systematic identity prejudice (e.g. racism) are undermined as testifiers to knowledge and as contributors to debates and conversations. In my view, a sharper focus on her work, and on subsequent literature, - for example, in relation to how social media encourage intellectual arrogance, disrespect and prejudice - could strengthen the article’s core argument.

The term ‘informed ignorance’ strikes me as problematical. Varieties of ignorance are explored in the extensive epistemological literature on ignorance – with which there is little evidence of engagement by the authors. I think they need to distinguish the various ways in which their term might apply – e.g., not only to the overload of false information but also to indifference or an inability to evaluate what is in fact true, or at least plausible, information. I presume that their references to virtue epistemology, social epistemology, etc., implies that they would agree that the acquisition of belief based on true information does not necessarily amount to the epistemic status of knowing. This raises questions about how the term ‘ignorance’ articulates with terms such as ‘believing’, ‘knowing’, ‘learning’, ‘truth’.

A difficulty of a different kind relates to the implication or assumption in the article that the current epistemic climate is worse than it has ever been. This strikes me as unhistorical. It is true that social media and other contemporary features of social life have degraded information publicly available, but there are other factors that need to be weighed against this, such as greater educational opportunities, the positive features of scepticism, the revealing of prejudices, arrogance and other epistemic vices. Furthermore, have other eras been any better? Have not all ages and all communities had their echo chambers and filter bubbles? What chance would a villager in eighteenth century, or even twentieth century, England have had of receiving a variety of different points of view concerning religion, politics or social justice? Could we not argue that their capacity for epistemic freedom was more limited than someone in a modern society with universal education, the internet and opportunities for travel? The valid points about a degraded epistemic environment have to be contextualised. More emphasis could be placed on the role of education in developing the kind of critical thinking and epistemic conscientiousness that the article suggests is required, and the existing work of schools and universities on this should not be undervalued.

Overall, therefore, I think the argument is interesting and potentially sound, but that it is so far unpersuasive in so far as it spreads itself too thinly and does not engage sufficiently with the epistemological concepts, complexities and principles on which it relies.

Comments for author File: Comments.pdf

Comments on the Quality of English Language

The language is most fine. Only an occasional sentence construction or word choice infelicity. A few split infinitives.

Author Response

Please see the attachment.

Author Response File: Author Response.pdf

Round 2

Reviewer 2 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

I appreciate the authors' thoughtful response to my previous comments, both in their cover letter and in the revised paper itself. The paper strikes me as significantly better now, if only in making clearer the interest of what it was saying even in the previous draft. 

Reviewer 3 Report

Comments and Suggestions for Authors

Thank you for your responses to my original review. You have made extensive revisions and, in my view, improved the clarity and cohesion of the argument. I still maintain that it would be further strengthened by engaging more with epistemological perspectives  - for example, in relation to the legitimate epistemic authority and/or epistemic norms concerning the acceptance of testimony - knowledge based entirely on (justified or rational) trust in the words of others. You mention epistemic virtues. Ignorance is especially dangerous when it is not recognised as such, when intellectual arrogance and incaution are dominant over epistemic humility and integrity. I would have liked more discussion of the believer's/knower's responsibilities in all this, and on the role of parenting and education in promoting intellectual virtues, which, after all, are important aspects of the epistemic environment or culture. Nevertheless, I think there is enough substance and originality as the article stands to warrant publication. 

Comments on the Quality of English Language

Making the changes has introduced a few additional sentence construction issues, where older bits have not been completely deleted. Otherwise, the quality of English is fine.